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principle, the federal court's foremost consideration should be the adequate
protection of federally created rights. The fact that the remedy sought
is essentially involved with matters of state law does not lead to the
conclusion that federal courts should not administer such relief. 26 The
federal courts have rejected such a contention in many cases involving
federal statutes and have not hesitated to invalidate consummated corporate transactions, although questions of state law were intimately concerned. 27 In construing the jurisdiction of the federal court so narrowly,
the court, in the instant case, has created a very real danger that a
federal right will be left dangling without a proper remedy - certainly,
without a uniform remedy.
Thomas 4. Hogan

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EvIDENCE
OBTAINED By UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE Is
CONSTITUTIONALLY

INADMISSIBLE

IN

STATE

CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.

Mapp v. Ohio (U.S. 1961).
Cleveland police officers forcibly entered the home of appellant and
during their search allegedly obscene materials were discovered. These
materials were used as evidence at appellant's trial which resulted in her
conviction for knowingly having had them in her possession.' No
attempt was made by the state to prove the existence of a warrant either
at the trial or at the hearing on a preliminary motion to suppress. The
26. The court, in the present case, placed peculiar stress upon Mr. Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18, 57 S. Ct.
96, 100 (1936). There, the defendant bank had assumed the liabilities of an insolvent
national bank and then had refused to pay the taxes which the national bank owed to
the state. It was claimed that, since a federal statute permitted the states to tax
national banks, the case was properly within the federal courts. Mr. Justice Cardozo,
speaking for a majority of the court, pointed out that the tax in question was one
imposed by the state, with the federal government merely consenting. He reasoned
that what was essentially involved was the breach of a contract right; the
question of the federal statute was merely collateral. The present court tries to
analogize from this decision, claiming that, since the remedy which plaintiff begged
involved state corporate law (as the right in the Gully case was founded upon state
law), the federal court should disclaim jurisdiction here, also. However, at best, the
analogy is transparent. There is all the difference in the world between the source
of a right and the source of a remedy. The source of a right determines what
court will enforce it; but it has never before been held that the source of a remedy
establishes what court should administer it.
27. E.g., Schine Chain Theatre, Inc. v. U.S., 334 U.S. 110, 128, 68 S. Ct. 947,
957 (1948), which was concerned with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 171-72, 68 S. Ct. 915, 936 (1948), which also
dealt with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act; Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 761-62
(2d Cir. 1955), which involved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
1. OHIo RIv. CODg ANN. § 2905.34 (Baldwin 1960).
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Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction since Ohio has no law
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, at
least where the evidence is not taken from the person by the use of brutal
force.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States, with three
justices dissenting, reversed, overruled Wolf v. Colorado,3 and held that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits a state
criminal court from admitting evidence obtained through unreasonable
search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court recognized that it is
unconstitutional to admit in a federal court evidence obtained through
unreasonable search and seizure. 4 The constitutional basis relied upon
by the Court was the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments,
for, as the Court stated, the unreasonable searches and seizures condemned
by the fourth amendment are usually made for the purpose of compelling
a person in a criminal case to be in effect a witness against himself in
violation of the fifth amendment. It was not until 1914, in Weeks v. United
States,6 that the Court held for the first time that, in a federal prosecution,
the fourth amendment alone bars the use of evidence obtained through
unreasonable search and seizure by federal officers. The fifth amendment
was not relied upon. The Court was careful to point out that the fourth
amendment is only applicable to the federal government and its agents and
provides no protection against the misconduct of state officers who are not
acting under any claim of federal authority.7 Most states continued to
follow the common law rule that relevant evidence is admissible in criminal prosecutions regardless of the means by which it was obtained and the
argument in favor of such a rule commanded impressive support.8 Even
the Supreme Court of the United States seemed to be swayed by the
general rejection of its exclusionary rule, for in 1927, in Byars v. United
States,9 it proclaimed that federal courts may make use of evidence improperly seized by state officers who are acting entirely on their own
account. This was the so called "silver platter" doctrine. 10
Although the first eight amendments to the Constitution limit only the
action of the federal government,"' certain of these limitations have been
held to be binding upon the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. This clause exacts from the states all that is
2. State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E. 2d 387 (1960).
3. 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949).

4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
5. Id. at 633, 34 S. Ct. at 534.
6. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
7. Id. at 398, 34 S. Ct. at 346.
8. E.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
9. 273 U.S. 28, 47 S. Ct. 248 (1927). The conviction here was reversed since
a federal agent participated in the search. As in Weeks, exclusion was based on
constitutional grounds.
10. The term "silver platter" actually came from a later Supreme Court decision,
Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 69 S. Ct. 1372 (1949).
11. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 12 In 1949, the Court was
finally faced with the problem whether certain immunities contained in the
fourth amendment are enforceable against the states through the due
process clause. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in the
Wolf case, stated that although the "core" of the fourth amendment, the
right to be free from arbitrary intrusions by the police; is "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," and therefore applicable to the states through
the due process clause, the exclusionary remedy is not a basic ingredient
of that right, and thus not applicable to state criminal proceedings. 13
The fact that most of the English speaking world did not regard the
exclusionary rule as vital to the protection of the right of privacy and
the belief that there were other means of protection, such as tort and
criminal actions against the offending police officers, were the determining factors upon which the Court based its ruling. Attempts were
subsequently made to have a federal court intervene in state criminal
proceedings to enjoin the use of illegally obtained evidence on the basis of
the Civil Rights Act,14 but in Stefanelli v. Minard,15 the Court held that
federal courts should refuse such intervention. However, in 1956, it was
held that a federal court should intervene to enjoin a federal officer from
testifying in a state criminal proceeding concerning evidence obtained by
him by means of an invalid search warrant. 16
The extreme methods adopted by some state officers in their zeal
to bring offenders to justice finally compelled the Supreme Court to draw
a line. In Rochin v. California,'7 a case involving elements of search and
seizure as well as violence to the person of the defendant, the Court held
inadmissible under the due process clause evidence obtained by "conduct
that shocks the conscience"' 8 and offends "the community's sense of fair
play and decency."' 19 Rochin was not a pure search and seizure case;
the decision clearly was based on the totality of the police officers' conduct. It raised the possibility, however, that evidence unlawfully seized
might be excluded if the methods of search and seizure were so obnoxious
12. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324, 58 S. Ct. 149, 151 (1937). Among the
examples cited by the Court are: freedom of speech, press and religion; right of
peaceable assembly; and right of one accused to the benefit of counsel.
13. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 1361 (1949). However
the Weeks rule was reaffirmed as to federal prosecutions on constitutional grounds.
Mr. Justice Black's concurring opinion, however, referred to the rule as one of
evidence.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958).
15. 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951).
16. Rea v.United States, 350 U.S. 214, 76 S. Ct. 292 (1956). The basis for
this decision was the Court's supervisory power over federal law enforcement
officers. But see Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 81 S. Ct. 632 (1961), for the
limitations of this rule.
17. 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 20S, (1952). Defendant swallowed narcotic capsules
as the police unlawfully broke into and entered his room. A stomach pump was used
to extract the evidence after physical force failed.
18. Id. at 172, 72 S.Ct. at 209.
19. Id. at 173, 72 S.Ct. at 210.
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as to outrage the community's conscience and "sense of justice." 20 This interpretation was largely negated, by the subsequent case of Irvine v.
California,2 ' which seemed to confine the Rochin doctrine to cases involving physical violence and brutality. The plurality of opinions in
Irvine pointed up just how undefined were the boundaries of the Rochin
test, and just how divided was the Court on its application. The net
effect of Rochin and Irvine, therefore, was to introduce yet another area
of ambiguity and uncertainty into the law of search and seizure.
The Court in the Irvine case refused to overrule the Wolf doctrine
before the states had an adequate opportunity to consider the rule, and
it noted22 that in the light of the facts before the Court the states might
wish to reconsider their evidentiary rules. Significantly, California, in the
following year adopted the exclusionary rule as a "judicially declared
rule of evidence". 23 Then in 1960, in Elkins v. United States, 24 the
"silver platter" doctrine was overturned when the Court declared that
evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by
federal officers, would have violated the defendant's right of privacy under
the fourth amendment is not admissible over the defendant's timely
objection in a federal criminal trial. Finally, the Supreme Court has
now closed "the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured
by official lawlessness ....
-25 Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, stated that when Wolf admitted that the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure was applicable against the states through
the due process clause, it was inconsistent when it denied to that right
the most important constitutional protection, the exclusion of the illegally
seized evidence. "To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
' '26
withhold its privilege and enjoyment.
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent argues that the Court, in overruling
Wolf, has disregarded the doctrine of stare decisis. Basic to this doctrine
is the idea that a decision is authority solely upon the points decided and the
facts in the particular case. But differing factual situations dictate differing
results and when this is so, as here, the doctrine is not being ignored. Indeed,
the rationale of Wolf 27 was that due process is a living principle and the
rights protected by it do not become petrified as of any one time. It is the
20. Id. at 173, 72 S. Ct. at 210 quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 279 U.S, 278,
285-86, 56 S. Ct. 461, 464-65.
21. 347 U.S. 128, 74 S. Ct. 381 (1954). Police unlawfully entered defendant's
home three different times to move a microphone into a strategic position. Police
testified at the trial concerning incriminating statements heard over the device.
22. Id. at 134, 74 S. Ct. at 384.
23. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955).
24. 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960). Departing from Weeks, as to the
basis of the rule, the Court said, "What is here invoked is the Court's supervisory
power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,
Id. at 216, 80 S. Ct. at 1443.
25. Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961).
26. Id. at 1692.
27. Ironically, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who joined the dissent in the instant
case wrote the opinion of the Court in Wolf.
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nature of a free society to progress in its standards of what is considered
reasonable and right. With this in mind, the Court has re-examined the
factual considerations upon which Wolf was based, found them no longer
controlling, 2s and has now concluded that exclusion is required by the
fourteenth amendment since it is essential to the protection of the right of
privacy.
The instant decision has laid to rest the controversy as to whether the
exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence or a constitutional imperative.
According to the explicit language of Weeks, the rule is of constitutional
origin,2 9 but later opinions have contained strong intimations to the contrary. 0 The present decision has brought the exclusionary rule back into
the realm of constitutional requirement and this is so with respect to both
federal and state courts. Therefore it would seem that Elkins is no
longer authority for the proposition that exclusion of illegally seized evidence in federal prosecutions is based on the Court's supervisory power.
The fourth amendment requires such exclusion. Also, states which have
excluded illegally seized evidence on the basis of their judicially declared
rules of evidence, and even those which have not, are required to do so
now by the fourteenth amendment. In addition to resolving this uncertainty, the instant decision has also effectively eliminated the problem of
Rochin and Irvine. The latter case recognized that there are varying degrees of unreasonableness involved in the state search and seizure cases,
but permitted the admission of evidence by state courts no matter how
obnoxious the obtaining means were, as long as it was short of coercion.
Now, if the evidence is seized unlawfully the state must exclude it.81
A uniform standard is thus placed on both federal and state courts and
this seems to be a healthy solution, not only because it puts an end to
needless conflict but also because the problem has been resolved in favor
of individual liberty and freedom.
Very closely related to the problem of illegally seized evidence is that
of wiretap evidence and its use in criminal proceedings. It was recently
urged that Pugach v. Dollinger, 2 which held that a federal court should
not enjoin a state officer from divulging wiretap evidence in a state
criminal trial, even though the introduction of such evidence would constitute a violation of a federal criminal statute pertaining to wiretapping, 3
28. Supra note 25, at 1690-91.
29. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S. Ct. 341, 346 (1914).
30. Wolf v. Colorado, supro note 13, at 39, 69 S. Ct. at 1367 (concurring opinion);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960).
31. In determining whether a state search and seizure is unreasonable, it is
not entirely clear what standards are to be applied. Elkins, contrary to Wolf, suggested

that the test is to be the fourth amendment, but see Ohio v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 80
S. Ct. 1463 (1960), where a municipal ordinance was upheld as valid, even though
it required home owners to give housing inspectors access to their dwellings without a

warrant.
32. 277 F. 2d 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 365 U.S. 458, 81 S.Ct. 650 (1961).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). "... . no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
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be reconsidered in the light of the instant decision. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this contention and
adhered to the Pugach rule. 4 Although wiretapping is not considered a
search and seizure, 5 it seems that it could be a federal crime to introduce
such evidence in either a state or federal court since this amounts to a
divulgence of the contents of the intercepted communication. State laws
continue to sanction the use of wiretap evidence and, just as with evidence obtained through unreasonable search and seizure, attempts by
state criminal defendants to get federal injunctive relief have been fruitless. Pugach shows the understandable reluctance of the Court to abandon
this policy which is based on a desire not to disrupt state criminal trials.8 6
What the outcome will be where the relief is sought after conviction is
another problem. Just as with unlawfully seized evidence, the federal
courts have excluded wiretap evidence.8 7 And as in Wolf, in 1952, in
Schwartz v. Texas,8 8 the Court refused to overturn a state criminal conviction obtained by the use of wiretap evidence and thus by illegal means.
The Court refused to extend by implication the meaning of the federal
statute so as to invalidate the state laws which render the evidence
admissible in their own courts.89 Now that the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, the only barrier remaining to
the overruling of Schwartz on constitutional grounds is the Olmstead
doctrine that wiretapping does not constitute search and seizure. This
barrier is at its lowest now, for the Court recently ruled that the slightest
physical penetration of an electronic device through the wall of defendant's
40
home, so-called electronic eavesdropping, constitutes search and seizure.
To say the invasion is a "search and seizure" only where there is a physical
penetration, however infinitesimal, is to overemphasize the instrumentality
at the expense of the right involved. Indeed, the Court recognized this
long ago in Boyd v. United States when it stated that there need not be
an actual entry upon the premises for there to be an unreasonable search
and seizure. 4 1 Whether the intimacies of the home are revealed by the
eavesdropping of a physically present officer or his equipment, or by the
34. Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1961).

35. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).
36. In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123, 72 S. Ct. 118, 121-22 (1951),
the Court noted, "If we were to sanction this intervention, we would expose every
State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural
due process of law ;--with its far-flung and undefined range - would invite a
flanking movement against the system of state courts by resort to the federal forum,
with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue." See also Wilson v.
Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 81 S. Ct. 632 (1961).
37. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S. Ct. 275 (1937); Benanti v.
United States, 355 U.S. 96, 78 S.Ct. 155 (1957).
38. 344 U.S. 199. 73 S.Ct. 232 (1952).
39. This particular rationale was discarded in Benanti, supra note 37, at 105-06,
78 S.Ct. at 160, when the Court said that it was not the intention of Congress to
allow state legislation which would contradict the express prohibition of the federal
statute, supra note 33.
40. Silverman v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 679 (1961).
41. Supra note 4, at 630.
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